1. Introduction. Over the last decade several authors have studied notions of similarity of information (e.g. Allen 1983 Allen , 1984 Cotter 1986; VanZandt 1988; and Stinchcombe 1990 ). In the economic context this similarity should be defined such that agents behave similarly when information is similar. By similarity of information we mean closeness of partitions, or o-fields, where prior probabilities remain fixed. Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Kajii and Morris (1994) study closeness of information when r--fields are held fixed while prior probabilities change. That is, behavior should reveal some continuity with respect to the topology defined on information. This paper is motivated by the observation that the existing notions concerning proximity of information, while guaranteeing similarity of behavior for similar information when a single agent is involved, fail to imply an analogous sameness of behavior in models in which agents interact. In the latter models, similarity of information for each single agent does not imply similarity of behavior for the group. We show that similarity of group information, for games with incomplete information, should be defined in terms of the common belief players have concerning the similarity of individuals' information. We define such a metrizable topology on group information, prove its adequacy for certain continuity properties of equilibria and show that it is the coarsest one that satisfies these properties. Continuity refers here to some sort of lower hemi-continuity. Roughly speaking, for a given information structure, a game with this structure, and an equilibrium of the game, close information structures have E-equilibria which are close to the given equilibrium. This type of continuity is considered also in Kajii and Morris (1994) , while Milgrom and Weber (1985) consider upper hemi continuity. The basic concept and properties of common belief are taken from Monderer-Samet (1989) (see also Fudenberg-Tirole 1990 for new results) but various variants of common belief are studied here to enable explicit definition of the metric. The notion of common belief, which is so central to our definition of proximity of information structure, does not appear in the works of Milgrom and Weber (1985) or Kajii and Morris (1994) , in which prior probabilities vary. The relation between their notions of proximity and ours awaits further research.
In Allen's work, and ensuing studies by others, information is given as a cr-field over a state space. Using a metric, defined by Boylan (1971) , on the space of all sub-cr-fields of a given r-field, Allen proves the continuity of demand and other In ?4 we take a closer look at common belief. We introduce new variants of this notion as it appears in the previous sections. General results about belief operators are presented and used to show that all the variants share some common features. These variants are used in the next section to define explicitly the metric that induces our topology.
In ?5 we define, for a given pair of information structures, the event that each player considers his partitions in the two information structures to be close. The event that the previous event is common belief is used to formulate several conditions which describe convergence of information structures. The basic idea is that two information structures are close if there is a high probability that players share a common strong belief that all of them consider their partitions to be close. We then state formally a continuity property for this topology and prove that even a weaker one requires a topology as strong as the one we define.
In ?6 we look at the case of a single agent, namely, one partition. The previous results apply to this as a special case and we show that the topology thus defined on partitions coincides with the Boylan topology. Moreover, the characterization of the general topology by means of continuity of equilibria gives rise, as a special case, to a characterization of the Boylan topology in terms of continuity of optimal plans. 2. Examples. Our first example shows a case in which information structures converge in the product topology (i.e., each player's partitions converge) and continuity of equilibrium does hold. [ -, 11] be partitions of H for agent 1. For big n we consider the partitions I1 and HII to be close and indeed it is hard to think of any notion of proximity for which this is not the case. In particular under the Boylan metric fII -* I1. There are several ways to express the continuity property of optimal plans in a single-agent decision problem with respect to this convergence (most of them are equivalent). We follow the one that was given in the introduction and which can be easily generalized to games. Suppose that agent 1 faces a decision problem over H with payoffs bounded to the interval [-1, 1]. That is, he has to choose an action where his utility depends on this action and the state o. If 8 is an optimal plan when the information is given by I1 then for each n > 4 there exists a plan 8n which coincides with 8 except for a set of measure 1 and is 8-optimal (i.e., given the information agent 1 has, he cannot improve upon an by more than 8). That is, 2's information has not changed and l's information has changed by splitting his information set (2n, 2n + 1) into two. First we note that for big n, H1 and HII are close in the sense explained above. For any decision problem of agent 1, any optimal plan when information is given by I1 can be made by small changes an almost optimal plan under IH. (In this example the second "almost" is not required. By changing the optimal plan over (2n) and (2n + 1), we get an optimal plan for Hl).
The resulting game is denoted by (II). The strategy ac according to which each player is choosing Cooperate regardless of the information he receives is an equilibrium of F(I). Under this strategy each player receives 4 in each state. to see that deviation to either Odd or Even is costly note that for each player the posterior probability that the state is odd or even is approximately
Examine now the game r(Hn). This game has a unique equilibrium. In state 2n player 1 can guarantee 6 by playing Even and this is the only strategy that pays him so well so he must play Even in 2n. When player 2 is informed (2n -1, 2n) he assigns a probability of approximately We are therefore led to the conclusion that II and I"n should not be considered close even for big ns. This is despite the fact the partitions of player 1 are the same in both information structures and those of player 2 are close. The phenomenon observed here is that the small, local, difference between the personal information of individuals in IIn and II, propagates in the whole space by the interlacing of partitions of different agents. We use here the notion of common belief to express and measure this propagation effect. It was used in Monderer and Samet (1990) to give a full account of how lack of cooperation propagates in the electronic mail game described by Rubinstein (1989) . Such propagation effects are studied in a different way by Sorin (1994) . We discuss this example again, at the end of ?4, after introducing the formal definition of metric on information structures and stating the continuity properties of equilibrium with respect to this metric.
Preliminaries. States and partitions:
We fix throughout the discussion a measure space (H, E, A), where H is the state space, X is a o field, and t a probability measure. Denote by E* the subset of E which consists of all non-null sets. Let 7 be the space of all partitions of 2f, the elements of which are in E*. For each HII e and o E f, we denote by H(w) the element of II which contains w. The ac field generated by II is denoted by n. The event that all players p-believe E at ow is denoted by BP(E) (or simply BP when II is clear from the context), that is B (E) = nfB (E).
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We can apply BP iteratively and thus for example BP(BP(E)) = (B)2(E) is the event that all p-believe that all p-believe that E. The event that E is common p-belief is CPI(E) = n (BP)n(E).
n>2
A state co is in Cf(E) iff all p-believe that all p-believe... that all p-believe that E, for any number of iterations of "all p-believe that."
4. Beliefs and common beliefs. In order to define a metric on 9N we introduce two variants of common belief-the common repeated belief and the joint common repeated belief. We also define acceptance operators which are useful in handling lack of common belief.
We start with some general remarks concerning operators on E. Consider two properties of an operator B: E -* S.
(a) Continuous monotonicity: If En I E (i.e., En is a decreasing sequence and
nEn = E) then B(En) B(E). (b) Subpotency: (B)2(E) c B(E). Any continuously monotonic, subpotent operator B: E -> X is called a belief operator. It is easy to verify that B BP B and Ci are all belief operators. Note also that these three operators satisfy also a third condition: (c) Continuous monotonicity in p: If Pn t p then BPN(E) BP(E).
Continuous monotonicity implies simple monotonicity. That is, if E c F than B(E) c B(F). The interpretation of this is straight forward: If event E implies event F then if E is believed so must be F. Note that continuous monotonicity holds only for decreasing sequences and not for increasing ones. Subpotency means that beliefs concerning beliefs are always correct. That is, if one believes that he believes E then indeed he does believe E. The following proposition is proved in Monderer-Samet (1989).
PROPOSITION 4.1. Let B be a belief operator and E an event. Then co E n, > 1B"n(E) iff there exists an event S such that co E S and (
4.1) S c B(S) n B(E).
Moreover, (4.1) is satisfied with equality by rn > 1 Bn(E) as S.
For a fixed E E consider the operator Bf(E n ) which is defined by B/(E n * XF) = B(E n F). Denote also by BP(E n ) the intersection n ie NBP(E n ). The event that E is common repeated p-belief is: CP(E) = f (B(E n))(E). n>1 712 PROXIMITY OF INFORMATION IN GAMES
Thus o e Cij(E) iff at oC, all p-believe that E and that all p-believe that E and that... all p-believe that E, for any number of iterations of "all p-believe that E and that." The "repeated" in this definition refers to the repetition of the belief in E in each iteration.
PROPOSITION 4.2. co E CP(E) iff there exists an event S such that co c S and (4.2) S c BP(S nE).
Moreover, (4.2) is satisfied with equality by Cj(E) as S.
PROOF. It is easy to see that BP(E n *) is a belief operator and therefore by Proposition 4.1 for any F, ) e n , > [BP(E n * )]n(F) iff there exists an event S such that co E S and (4.3) S c BP(E n S) n BP(E nF).
Moreover, (4.3) is satisfied with equality by n n2 1[BP(E n * )]n(F) as S. Substituting
E for F in (4.3) and noting that BP(E n *) is monotonic we see that (4.3) is equivalent to (4.2). o We want now to express the fact that an event E is common p-believed simultaneously in two information structures II? and I11. This is done by looking at the operator Bf,o ril which is defined for each E by: Bno Ii(0E) = Bfo(E) n Bfi(E).
Using BPo r1i we define for a given E, BPjo ,i(E n ) by: Bio,(E n ) = Bo(E ) n (E n) n B(E n ).
Thus BPo r1(E n -)(F) is the event that all p-believe E and F under either information structure. The event that E is joint common repeated p-belief is:
CP, rIl(E) = n (BP j(E n ))"(E).
n>1
Clearly co e C,o jnj(E) whenever at tc all p-believe under either information structure that E and that all p-believe under either information structure that E and that... all p-believe under either information structure that E, for any number of iterations of "all p-believe under either information structure that E and that." We omit the easy proof of the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4.4. C( and Co, n, are belief operators and also continuously monotonic in p.
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In order to describe the event that some other event is not common p-belief we introduce a new operator. We say that player i p-accepts E at o if (EIni(c)) > p. Denote by AP (E) the event that i p-accepts A, i.e.,
APi(E) = {oJI/(EIH/i(c)) >p}.
The operator Ai is very similar to Bp except that unlike the latter it is defined with a strong inequality. But we are using acceptance here in its statistical meaning and prefer to think of p as being small (as opposed to the p in the belief operator). Thus if we think of E as being a null hypothesis then it is enough that its probability is small, say 0.05, in order that we accept it or rather not reject it.
Clearly, BP(E) = AI(E) where we denote by X the complement of an event X and = 1 -p. The event that someone p-accepts E is obviously UiENAP(E), which we denote by Af (E). Here again BP(E) = A (E). It easily follows now that: C(E) = U (A?)n(E). n2l
Thus E is not common p-belief at w if someone p-accepts that someone p-accepts that... that someone p-accepts E, for some finite repetition of "someone p-accepts." The next proposition follows easily from the definition of Api.
PROPOSITION 4.5. The operators AP and AP are continuously monotonic w.r.t. increasing sequences of events. That is, if En T E then APi(E) T A (E) and API(E )? An(E).
5. The main results. As was demonstrated in Example 2 of ?2, two information structures II and II' may differ very much game theoretically even when for each i the partitions Ili and I' are close. We want to define proximity of information structures such that if II and I' are close then for any game r(II), each equilibrium of this game can be approximated by some almost-equilibrium of (II'). We formalize in this section the following notion of proximity and show its adequacy to our purpose.
H and II' are close if, with high probability, there is a common strong belief that the information each i receives under the partition IIi is almost the same as the one he receives under the partition HIi.
Moreover, we will show that this notion of proximity is also necessary to guarantee the continuity of equilibria that we require.
Since common p-beliefs are applied to events we have to define first the event that the information each i receives under the partition Ii is almost the same as the one he receives under the partition HI. Clearly c is in this event if for each i, the sets nI (o) and II (o) are very "close." In order to grasp this latter notion of closeness we define a pseudo metric on events which expresses sameness of information. We cannot use the standard pseudo metric on E which for given two sets A and B is the measure of the symmetric difference of the sets ,I((A \ B) u (B \A)). Any two small sets are considered close by this metric. But at a given Ct in A n B the information given by A may be viewed very differently from that given by B, despite the fact that the sets are small. We are looking thus for a metric that measures the differences between the sets, ex-post, i.e. relative to the size of the sets. Therefore we take into account ,u(A \ BIA) and ,t(B \AIB). When these terms are small it means that most of A is in B, and most of B is in A. It is enough now to prove that, max{al + c2a, c1 + a2c < max{al, a2} + max{cl, c2}.
Because of the symmetry it suffices to show that the first element on the left hand side is less than the right hand side. We examine two cases. If a1 > a2 then a < 1 and hence, al + c2a < al + C2 < max{al, a2} + max{c, c2}.
Suppose now that a1 < a2. It is enough to show that, a1 + c2a < a2 + c2 or equivalently that, c2(a -1) < a2 -a1. This is reduced to c2(a2 -al)/(l -a2) < a2 -al, or c2 < 1 -a2, which follows from the assumption that all as and bs are less than 4. Note that III n'(E) is continuously monotonic in E w.r.t. decreasing sequences, i.e., if e , E then In, n,(en) In, n,(e). After identifying the event that the individual partitions are almost the same with the set In n'(e), we go back to the informal definition of proximity that we gave in the beginning of this section. Three parameters determine the proximity of information structures II and II'. The measure of sameness of private information--, the strength of the common belief in this sameness-p, and the probability that such common belief holds-t(CR (In, n,(E)) ).
The two information structures are closer, the closer is the first parameter, E, to 0 and the other two to 1. The following theorem presents several ways in which a topology on aN can be described using these parameters, and states that this topology is metrizable. In the proof of this proposition we use the following two lemmata. 
